(Small) Enterpreneurs first!:Analysis of the economic discourse of the Vlaams Belang by Coffé, Hilde
  




Journal of Language and Politics
DOI:
10.1075/jlp.7.1.02cof
IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2008
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Coffé, H. (2008). (Small) Enterpreneurs first! Analysis of the economic discourse of the Vlaams Belang.
Journal of Language and Politics, 7(1), 31. https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.7.1.02cof
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Journal of Language and Politics 7:1 (2008), 31–52.  doi 10.1075/jlp.7.1.02cof
issn 1569–2159  / e-issn 1569–9862 © John Benjamins Publishing Company
(Small) Enterpreneurs first!
Analysis of the economic discourse  
of the Vlaams Belang*
Hilde Coffé
Utrecht University
A large body of research on political parties is devoted to the family of extreme 
right parties. Yet, systematic analyses of extreme right parties’ discourse remain 
scarce. The present study addresses this gap in the literature by providing a 
discourse analysis of the Vlaams Belang, one of the most successful extreme 
right-wing parties in Europe. Moreover, by focusing on this party’s economic 
discourse, the study also sheds new light on the ongoing debate about the 
economic viewpoints of the new extreme right parties. We conclude that the 
Vlaams Belang’s economic rhetoric is in line with its ethno-linguistic, nationalist 
standpoints and pleas for a Flemish economic policy. The party’s economic 
programme is built on liberal points of view and seems particularly aimed at 
attracting (dissatisfied) liberal voters. Importantly, as economic issues remain 
subordinated to the party’s ideological core, it appears that the Vlaams Belang has 
largely instrumentalised its programme to expand its electorate.
Keywords: discourse; extreme right parties; economic party manifesto; Flanders
1.  Introduction
The lasting success of extreme right-wing parties in several Western European 
countries has made the extreme right-wing family of parties one of the most fre-
quently discussed topic in political science. In spite of the wide range of research 
activities regarding extreme right-wing parties, their ideology and discourse has, 
however, been given relatively little attention (Mudde 2000).
This article represents a first step to fill this gap. We examine the use of language 
by the Vlaams Belang as one of the extreme right-wing parties having the greatest 
electoral success (Coffé 2008). In particular, we concentrate on its use of language 
regarding economics. This is important because the international scientific 
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literature contains contradictory ideas with respect to the economic points of view of 
extreme right-wing parties. Whereas Kitschelt (1995) uses the free market econo-
my as a starting point for his ‘winning formula’, authors such as Mudde (1999 and 
2007) and Rydgren (2002) state that extreme right-wing parties are rather nation-
alist and protectionist when it comes to economy. Our analysis assesses whether 
the Vlaams Belang meets Kitschelt’s (1995) definition of the ideal-typical extreme 
right-wing party combining neo-liberal ideology with authoritarianism and eth-
nocentrism. We therefore analyse the texts published by the party on the occasion 
of its Economic Congress in November 2005, the context for the presentation of 
its economic programme.
The present article is structured as follows. In a first section, we briefly discuss 
the existing literature with regard to the economic discourse of extreme right-
wing parties. The second, most extensive part of this article contains our analysis. 
We then first discuss our research materials and the method we have applied, to 
continue with the discussion of the party’s economic discourse. The final para-
graph summarizes our most important findings and suggests some directions for 
future research.
.  Economic views of extreme right-wing parties
In his influential work The Radical Right in Western Europe, Kitschelt (1995) em-
phasizes market liberalism as a central characteristic of successful new extreme 
right-wing parties. He associates ideal-typical extreme right-wing parties with a 
combination of neo-liberalism, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism. According 
to Kitschelt, with a ‘winning formula’ of free market ideas combined with authori-
tarianism and xenophobia, extreme right-wing parties can occupy a certain niche 
of the electoral market and succeed in attracting a wide audience: the working 
class responds to the parties’ authoritarian and ethnocentric ideas, whereas the 
free market ethics appeal to the self-employed.
However, Kitschelt’s definition of successful extreme right-wing parties has 
been sharply criticized. A first point of criticism raised against his analysis is that 
the new extreme right-wing parties are less market-oriented than Kitschelt claims 
them to be. Mudde (1999), for example, states that they tend to have a ‘welfare 
chauvinist’ economic programme. The welfare state is presented as a system of 
social protection for those who are part of the ethically defined community. Ac-
cording to Mudde (1999), these extreme right parties’ programmes reflect to their 
nationalism, and are consequently ‘economically nationalist’. The economy is sup-
posed to serve the nation and therefore national companies and workers should be 
protected against foreign competitors. Mughan et al. (2003) also state that extreme 
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right-wing parties adhere to economically nationalist points of view and even 
advocate protectionist measures, at least with regard to the international economy. 
Concerning the national economy, however, they are in favour of free market prin-
ciples. Others have argued that the validity of Kitschelt’s argument seems tempo-
rally bounded. Lubbers (2001), for example, notes that in programmes of extreme 
right-wing parties, market-oriented liberal points of view were abandoned during 
the nineties. In his opinion, their economic points of view were adjusted in favour 
of a policy of increased government regulation. Rydgren (2002), too, states that 
during the nineties most extreme right-wing parties adopted protectionist ideas 
and tended towards an economic position in the centre or even to a left-wing 
position. Finally, Betz (2002) concludes that the FPÖ, in providing an answer to a 
growing number of social questions, significantly moderated its neo-liberal eco-
nomic programme. Interestingly, while McGann & Kitschelt (2005) state that the 
‘winning formula’ still applies to the FPÖ and the SVP, they too acknowledge that 
neo-liberal thinking weakened among many extreme right-wing parties during the 
nineties. Still, they argue that the ‘winning formula’ does not need consistent neo-
liberalism, but rather a compromise that sufficiently targets the free market to attract 
petit bourgeois voters but at the same time does not scare away the working classes 
with an attack on the welfare state. Moreover, it should promise protection to both 
groups. This point of view is much in line with Ignazi (1996), who also states that 
the combination of free market principles and protectionist measures is typical of 
extreme right-wing parties. Their political programmes are, according to Ignazi, a 
mix of social protection limited to the native population with private initiative.
A second point of criticism levelled at Kitschelt is that neo-liberalism is not 
a necessary ingredient of successful extreme right parties (a.o. Betz 1996; Schain 
1997; Mudde 1999 and 2007). Mudde (1999) states that the economic theme is 
at best a secondary topic for extreme right-wing parties. According to Ignazi 
(2002), this is partially due to a lack of ‘economic culture’ among party leaders, 
a lack of the expectation of government participation, and a lack of credibility 
with regard to this theme, even among party members and voters. However, 
although the economic theme has not led to the breakthrough of extreme right-
wing parties, some parties are increasingly emphasizing this theme and extend-
ing their electoral programme with it. Also, some leading members in the more 
successful parties started to recognise the relatively scant attention that was paid 
to socio-economic themes. Bruno Mégret, at that time still the number two of 
the FN, said in 1996: “Today, we are recognized as competent in the area of in-
security or immigration: tomorrow we must conquer a third important domain, 
the economic and social.” (quoted in Mudde, 2007). The broadening of their 
programme is obviously also a tactical tool to attract a new group of voters. 
Similarly, Michels states in his work of 1962 that the radical left-wing parties, in 
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order to maintain their increasing power, broadened their programme so as to 
attract a wider electorate.
.  Analysis
Two important questions emerge from the discussion in the previous section. 
These relate to the two unresolved issues with respect to the economic stance of 
new extreme right parties. The first question is how important extreme right par-
ties’ economic programme is in relation to the rest of their ideological views. That 
is, to the extent that these parties develop an economic programme, is this treated 
at the same level as its authoritarian and ethnocentric agenda, or does it rather 
play (at best) second cello? The second question pertains to the specific content 
of extreme right-wing parties’ economic programmes. In order to examine both 
these issues, we analyse the economic programme of the Vlaams Belang. Particu-
larly, we perform a qualitative discourse analysis based on the texts written on 
the occasion of the Vlaams Belang’s Economic Congress organised on the 26th 
November, 2005. While the next two subsections provide background information 
on the texts and our methodology, the results of our analysis are contained in the 
third subsection.
.  Research materials and methodology
As mentioned, the texts written on the occasion of the Vlaams Belang’s Economic 
Congress represent the subject of our analysis. They entail two texts presented at the 
Introductory Colloquium on Economy (Startcolloquium, Saturday 18th June, 2005) 
and the final Economic Manifesto. The different texts focus on the external environ-
ment and can consequently be defined as ‘front stage’ documents. More particularly, 
the texts appeal to party representatives and members, but also to a wider audience. 
Although the number of readers of official party texts is small, there are still many 
so-called indirect readers who hear or read about the report in the media. The Intro-
ductory Colloquium and the Congress were indeed discussed in several media.
The first text presented at the Introductory Colloquium, a so-called ‘Draft 
Manifesto’ (Ontwerpmanifest), is a text with the specific objective of launching 
the discussion about the economic programme on the one hand, and engaging 
with several economic actors on the other. These two goals explain the presence 
of many rhetorical questions – often containing an accusation – in the text. One 
example is the following question, designed to legitimize the party’s advocacy of 
minimum tax pressure:
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When taxes are too high and paperwork is obstructive, then how can free entre-
preneurship exist? Is it still possible to hire the person one really wishes to hire? 
Is property still truly inspiring? (Draft Manifesto, 6)
Although the text is meant to start a dialogue, rhetorical questions such as these 
prevent it from being truly dialogic. Moreover, it does not contain alternative pro-
posals and doubts are nowhere to be found. This is in line with Fairclough’s (1992) 
observation that modern-day policy statements are more promotional than ana-
lytical, more concerned about convincing people than starting a dialogue.
The second document presented at the Introductory Colloquium, the so-called 
‘Focus Text’, analyses the results of a ‘Tour of Flanders’, organised by the Vlaams 
Belang to interrogate several actors about their points of view. These company 
visits and conversations ‘in the field’ inspired – according to Annemans (Interview, 
17th January, 2006) – the programme and provided the party with important eco-
nomic know-how. The programme was written during a process of consultation 
targeted at providing the party with ‘a broad base’ for its economic ideology. This 
populist rhetoric is typical for the Vlaams Belang, and new extreme right-wing 
parties in general. Indeed, they aim above all at the ‘people’s will’, which they repre-
sent and respect. The Draft Manifesto, for example, opens with the statement that 
“the Vlaams Belang is the political party listening to Flanders” (Draft Manifesto, 1).
Information about the study that the Vlaams Belang organised during its 
‘Tour of Flanders’, however, is not provided in the texts. Consequently, the reader 
lacks the necessary elements to form an opinion about the quality of the figures 
and their relevance to the party’s arguments. Still, the party means to ‘prove’ its 
statements with these figures. The poll is also indicative of the populist fascination 
with simple survey results (because of their homogenizing effect) as the ultimate 
reflection of ‘the voice of the people’ (Papadopoulos 2002). Apart from its own 
research results, the party also enumerates various other studies in its Focus Text. 
This generates an impression of scientific rigour, which is difficult to contradict by 
the Vlaams Belang’s opponents. So whereas the Draft Manifesto is full of rhetorical 
questions, the Focus Text is principally an enumeration of different research re-
sults, often completed with statements of (scientific) experts or journalists. In the 
Focus Text, the readers are asked no questions – they are merely being informed.
The Draft Manifesto and the Focus Text are characterised by an absence of 
specific proposals. Such proposals are elaborated upon in the final Economic 
Manifesto ‘Enterprise in Flanders Prosperity for All’ (Ondernemend Vlaan-
deren Welvaart voor Iedereen). The costs of these proposals have, however, not 
been calculated. Moreover, since the Vlaams Belang to date remains a perma-
nent opposition party as a consequence of the cordon sanitaire, it can easily 
‘overpromise’ and has the advantage over its opponents that it cannot be judged 
on its actions.
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The Economic Manifesto was the result of the reflections of different study 
groups – open to all members – consisting of approximately twenty people, in-
cluding party members and people from the business world it had met during its 
Tour of Flanders. The study groups – unanimously – drafted texts that were sum-
marized into the final Economic Programme. Allowing ‘the people’ to be part of 
the programme’s elaboration, the party has once again used a populist approach, 
even though the party leaders clearly pulled the strings (Interview, 17th January, 
2006). Yet, as such, the discourse of the party may claim popular support while 
at the same time preformulating the terms that help create the state of mind that 
gives rise to such support in the first place (van Dijk 1993).
The texts have been analysed qualitatively. The choice of a qualitative research 
approach is directly related to the flexibility and possibilities this approach offers 
and to the question contained in our analysis. The aim of our research is to under-
stand how the Vlaams Belang constructs reality through language and argumenta-
tion and which (economic) order the party aspires to. The analysis means to point 
out how the world (i.c. economic events) is presented by the Vlaams Belang and 
which different contexts of interpretation – discourses (presenting and construct-
ing social reality) – play a part. These discourses are placed in the light of the 
Flemish (and Belgian) political context and consequently linked to and compared 
with the discourses used by the other social and political actors. Indeed, since we 
consider discourse as a social and interactive practice (see also Fairclough 1992 & 
2003; Duranti & Goodwin 1992; Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Blommaert 2005), the 
discourse of one party cannot be considered in isolation, but should be studied by 
taking into account the context in which it is created. That is, to understand and 
explain the political use of language, it has to be contextualised in the broadest 
possible way by placing it in light of other statements, the general balance of power 
in societies, events, etc. This idea to include the context into our analysis is also in 
line with our definition of discourse. We define discourse in terms of its content as 
a set of policy ideas and values, and in terms of its usage, as a process of interaction 
focused on policy formulation and communication (Schmidt 2004).
Although the use of rhetorical techniques is treated on a secondary level, mak-
ing an inventory of discourses represents the core of our analysis.
.  Results
Let us now turn to the results of our discourse analysis, which investigates 
Kitschelt’s (1995) thesis that neo-liberal economics constitutes a defining element 
of new extreme right parties. Firstly, we explore whether the economic issue is 
indeed a central theme in the Vlaams Belang’s discourse, or rather remains of 
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secondary importance. The second section explores the argument that the party 
holds neo-liberal views on the economy.
.1 The importance of the economic issue
The organisation of an economic congress by the Vlaams Belang may be seen as 
an attempt of the party to broaden its programme. During an interview with the 
author (17th January, 2006), Gerolf Annemans, President of the Vlaams Belang’s 
Research Service and organiser of the Economic Congress, confirmed that the 
Economic Manifesto had to fill a gap in the party’s programme. He was of the 
opinion that the party had previously not given sufficient attention to economic is-
sues and had limited itself to advocating a more central role for Flanders. Still, with 
the Economic Manifesto, he argues that the Vlaams Belang has conceived a better-
founded vision of economy and employment. Moreover, according to Annemans, 
the organisation of the Congress and of previous activities such as the ‘Tour of 
Flanders’ (Ronde door Vlaanderen), have led to the disappearance of their ‘cold 
feet’ concerning the economic theme. In line with Ignazi’s (2002) conclusions, 
according to Annemans, there was no ‘economic culture’ within the party before 
the organisation of the Economic Congress. Mudde (2000) also states that the 
socio-economic policy of the Vlaams Belang originally reflected the interests of 
only a few office holders. By extending its programme with economic standpoints, 
the party is aiming to enlarge its electorate and attract particularly liberal voters. 
In an interview, the party president Frank Vanhecke told the Flemish newspaper 
De Standaard (15th June, 2005) that “[…] the VLD (the Flemish liberal party) 
has disappointed quite a few people among self-employed and entrepreneurs. Those 
people are now turning to us. They are also asking for a well-founded socio-economic 
programme.” In his concluding speech, the party leader even compared the party’s 
programme with the ideas Verhofstadt proposed before he became Prime Min-
ister: “The analysis of measures that are needed to ensure the Flemish’ prosperity 
which we present today, is remarkably similar to the analysis that the former leader 
of the opposition, Guy Verhofstadt, made six years ago, in 1999 before the formation 
of his first purple coalition.” Clearly, Vanhecke counted on triggering some associa-
tions with Verhofstadt who was very successful in 1999 with a liberal economic 
programme.
Yet, despite the party’s focus on the economic issue by organising an Eco-
nomic Congress, party representatives made it clear several times that the eco-
nomic theme remains secondary. Gerolf Annemans, for example, stated at a press 
meeting organised during the Congress: “The principles of our economic pro-
gramme have been laid down and we can now start working on something far more 
important: local elections.” In his closing speech, party president Frank Vanhecke 
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therefore quickly moved on from economic recipes to his ‘own’ familiar themes, 
particularly immigration policy. Anke Vandermeersch’s final speech, too, contained 
a link from the economic theme to the presence of non-European foreigners. She 
argued that “the foreigners in our country are not exactly an economic value-added 
but rather a serious economic burden” and that “immigration is the cause of tax rise 
and in the long run also has a financial impact on our public sector”. Hence, we may 
conclude that – contrary to Kitschelts (1995) assumption – the economic issue 
remains a secondary issue to the Vlaams Belang.
.  The economic ideology
The analysis regarding our second research question, namely whether or not the 
Vlaams Belang has a neo-liberal ideology, is structured according to three key 
concepts that are typical of the party’s attitude and discourse on the occasion of 
the Economic Congress. The choice of themes is therefore based on the ample 
attention these themes are given in the party documents we have examined and 
originates from a constant dialogue with the underlying data. More specifically, 
the themes pertain to the party’s advocacy of a Flemish economic policy, a per-
forming government and an enterprise-friendly Flanders.
Explicit references to the texts are printed in italics and represent illustrations 
of the discourse patterns used by the Vlaams Belang on the occasion of its Eco-
nomic Congress.1 They are supplemented with quotes by other political and social 
actors to place the discourse of the Vlaams Belang in its societal context.
.  A Flemish economic policy
The economic texts of the Vlaams Belang are characterised by their Flemish/ 
Walloon, ethno-linguistic orientation. The party’s discourse regarding an opti-
mum economic policy is thus founded on its ethno-linguistic point of view and 
its aspiration to Flemish independence. Gerolf Annemans expresses the party’s 
appeal for a Flemish economic policy as follows:
Our USP (Unique Selling Proposition) concerning economics and prosperity consists 
of three things: Flanders, Flanders, and once again Flanders. (Manifesto, 3)
Proof for its ethno-linguistic rhetoric can also be found in the following quote, 
wrapped up in the rhetorical context of an argument containing different aspects: 
the ground, the warrant, the claim and the backing of the claim (Van Eemeren et al. 
1997).
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[Ground] Economic depression in Wallonia?
[Warrant] Flanders and Wallonia are so different economically that a common 
policy is harmful to both regions.
[Backing] In Wallonia, a priority should for instance be the huge unemployment 
figures whereas Flanders – due to the openness of its economy – should especially 
pay attention to its competitive powers.
[Claim] It is high time that Flanders emphasizes certain elements as it sees fit, 
targeting its own specific situation. (Focus Text, 4)
The problem is that Flanders and Wallonia are very different when it comes to 
their respective economies, and the solution the party proposes aims at an en-
tirely independent economic policy for each region. Interestingly, however, this 
discourse about the different economic situation in Flanders and Wallonia and 
the related plea for the federalisation of (parts of) the economic policy can also 
be found among traditional Flemish parties. During their May 2005 Party Con-
gress, the Flemish liberals insisted on a transfer of powers such as price policy, 
labour market policy and tax policy from the federal to the Flemish government 
during the next round of reform of the Belgian state. In its presentation of a socio- 
economic alternative (October 2005), CD&V (the Flemish Christian-Democrats) 
stated that regional entities should have control over economic instruments. 
CD&V would like Flanders to pursue its own policy concerning income, employ-
ment, research and development and corporate taxation. When he was Vice Prime 
Minister, Johan Vande Lanotte (SP.A, the Flemish Socialist Party) made it clear 
that the French-speaking people would be wise to accept a far-reaching regionali-
sation of socio-economic policy.
Outside the political world, many actors stress the different economic situa-
tion in Flanders and Wallonia and the need for regionalisation of economic policy. 
In 2005, a group of Flemish business leaders published a manifesto (Warande 
Manifest) in favour of separation of the Belgian state structure. They argued that 
the current Belgian government structure is an obstruction to the development of 
secure prosperity.
Interestingly, while many Walloon policy-makers also agree that the Flemish and 
Walloon economies are different, they generally do not agree with the solution – i.e., 
the regionalisation of economic policy – advanced by the Vlaams Belang. In fact, 
they tend to emphasize the importance of solidarity. Elio Di Rupo, the President 
of Wallonia’s Socialist Party (PS), for example, speaks of a win-win situation (dur-
ing the Flemish Radio 1 programme Actueel on 24th February, 2005) that might 
result in cooperation between Dutch and French speakers: “Because Flanders takes 
advantage from an economically strong Wallonia.”
In the Focus Text, the party’s statement regarding the different economic 
situation in both regions refers to various ‘experts’. Accordingly, in an attempt to 
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legitimise its own views, the Vlaams Belang cleverly uses the myth of ‘indepen-
dent, objective’ science. To avoid accusations of ‘partiality’, the party also includes 
findings of Walloon professors or statements of Walloon politicians. This way, it 
counters possible criticism about being ‘prejudiced’ against the Walloons.
In March 2005, MR (Wallonia’s liberal party) senator Alain Destexhe published a 
devastating analysis of the Walloon economy. […]Destexhe concludes that the Walloon 
government’s Contract for the Future ought to be done away with and replaced by 
a new pact containing far-reaching measures, targeted at structural growth of 
employment. (Focus Text, 1)
Such a reference to a Walloon senator criticising Walloon policy is a means for the 
party to show it agrees with this politician. Implicitly, this is a reprimand of other 
Walloon policy makers. These – and in particular the PS – are deemed responsible 
for Wallonia’s economic depression.
The primary culprits of this debacle are the Walloon socialists. Whereas every-
where in Europe socialist parties have reformed to modern parties, the PS clings 
to a completely outdated political and economic culture. Wallonia remains a PS 
state that is entirely government-oriented. Foreign examples – just think of Labour 
under Blair or Schröder’s SPD – prove that a different solution is possible. (Focus 
Text, 2)
This paragraph invites the reader to associate Wallonia with the PS – L’état PS is 
mentioned accordingly – and with a ‘rigid’ PS in particular. Consequently, this is 
a stereotyped statement. Wallonia is mentioned, but only one aspect is described, 
and in a very negative way. That antiquated image of the PS is then contrasted 
with the ‘modern’ social democratic parties of Blair and Schröder that have been 
trendsetters in using a ‘Third Way’ discourse.
Presenting Wallonia as a PS state with an interventionist reflex has, however, 
not exclusively been a Vlaams Belang initiative. Several Flemish politicians and 
commentators have the same idea of a rigid, conservative and archaic PS obstruct-
ing economic prosperity in Wallonia. Marc De Vos (a member of the liberal think 
tank Nova Civitas) for instance, talks of “a PS state with legions of civil servants and 
unemployed” in a column published in De Standaard (31st August, 2005). De Vos 
presents the PS as the “Parti Schizophrène” that despite its rhetoric of ‘Nouveau PS’ 
wants new subsidies and more taxes for Belgium and Wallonia.
An outline of the situation is another argumentative strategy for the Vlaams 
Belang to legitimize its solution, i.e., regionalisation of economic policy:
Wallonia remains the poor student in the EU class and in the short term even risks 
being overtaken by different regions of the former Eastern Bloc. It is nowhere near 
to catching up with Flanders. (Focus Text, 1)
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The party further justifies its demand for regionalisation by stressing that it would 
also be to the advantage of Wallonia, as can be observed in the following rhetorical 
questions from the Draft Manifesto:
In fact this entire reality of two economies kept together is only possible because of 
those transfers (the interregional money streams, HC). Is it not necessary that po-
litical Flanders questions this cohabitation in all tranquillity, also for the benefit of 
Walloon self-sufficiency? And in particular for the benefit of economic development 
in Flanders as well as in Wallonia? (Draft Manifesto, 7)
The questions suggest that the Vlaams Belang is also in favour of a regionalisa-
tion ‘for Wallonia’s own good’. However, one of the implications of this appar-
ent empathy is, as van Dijk (1993) evokes, not only to blame the victim (in this 
case Wallonia), but also to punish the region for being victim in the first place. 
The rhetoric defending the regionalisation also says something as: “We have done 
everything for you we could, now it’s your turn.” In its Focus Text, the Vlaams Belang 
accordingly states that Wallonia should “rely on its own strengths and advantages”, 
referring to a number of concrete benefits, such as “Liège that with Bierset has an 
international airport and an important European inner harbour” (Focus Text, 2).
In conclusion, it is clear that the Vlaams Belang presents both regions differently 
and uses this difference to ‘prove’ the necessity of its solutions (i.e., regionalisation 
of economic policies). Following a ‘we are good, but they are bad comparison’, 
Flanders is portrayed in a positive way, whereas Wallonia is associated with negative 
characteristics. The negative, stereotypical presentation of Wallonia can nonethe-
less also be found among other Flemish parties and social actors. In Flanders, 
Wallonia corresponds to a handful of pejorative terms such as impoverishment, 
political favouritism, an ailing economy, and high unemployment. We thus recog-
nise in the political discourse in Flanders the central component in many political 
communication, namely the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Wodak 2002). In 
this case, ‘us’ is the Flemish region which is painted in a positive way and set in 
opposition to ‘them’, the Walloon region, which is debased. This distinction then 
allows readers to identify themselves with Flanders and for negative characterization 
of Wallonia.
The following example of a description of both regions in the Draft Manifesto 
is illustrative:
The Flemish economy is a modern, open economy with a solid international reputa-
tion regarding productivity, technical knowledge and willingness to work. SMEs and 
the self-employed are the driving force behind its prosperity. […] With its traditional 
industry Wallonia has, however, clung to state subsidies. An incomparably large part 
of the population is reliant on state benefits. Only 22% of the Walloons actively contrib-
utes to government income with a tax on their private income. (Draft Manifesto, 6–7)
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With the above quote, the party also paints the Flemish economy as ‘Flemish 
cultural heritage’ built on a foundation of small-scale enterprises which are “the 
backbone of the Flemish economy” (Manifesto, 77). This quote also illustrates that 
particularly the entrepreneurs in these small companies are targeted in the Vlaams 
Belang’s economic discourse. We return to this issue below.
.  A performing government
New extreme right-wing parties in general, and the Vlaams Belang in particular, 
attempt to mobilise people by standing up for them while campaigning against 
the political system and the establishment (Taggart 2000). This is in line with the 
party’s aspiration to reduce the governing body’s size and restrict the government’s 
role.
Those things that can be realized more efficiently at a lower level, must not be left 
in the hands of a nameless authority far from the people. The government and the 
political authorities should therefore in principle act modestly and with reticence. 
(Draft Manifesto, 5)
The principle of a smaller government that the Vlaams Belang advocates corre-
sponds to the discourse of other parties. The VLD, for instance, explains that “it 
should always be considered whether government initiative or regulation does not 
cost society more than market failure. […] The government should permanently ex-
amine how it can increase citizens’ freedom of spending with a rejection of tasks or by 
outsourcing them. […] The government’s sphere of activity should clearly be delim-
ited and restricted, resulting in a slim state.” (Congress Text May 2005: 8). In his Civil 
Manifestos, Verhofstadt went one step further. His first manifesto (Verhofstadt 
1991) even contained a complete paragraph dedicated to the right of abandoning 
the state. Citizens should “be given the possibility to secure vital issues such as their 
children’s education, their old age or their health without any intervention from the 
state and politics.” (57).
The Vlaams Belang proposes a ‘performing’ government rather than a gov-
ernment ‘in control’, and speaks in favour of ‘more with less’. It is nonetheless 
remarkable that in its economic discourse, the party advocates a government that 
is more in the background and less in control, whereas concerning themes such as 
criminality and asylum, it demands stricter government oversight.
The government – unfortunately – targets control more than profitability. The com-
mon interest would benefit more from a performing government, attaining concrete 
and significant policy objectives, and less from a government in control, that wishes 
to be present everywhere in society. (Focus Text, 16)
Similarly, CD&V states that “the government should especially be a better 
regulator and much less of an actor.” (Presentation Socio-Economic Alternative, 
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October 2005). Among liberals as well, the ‘more with less’ argument can be 
observed: “The government should make sure that the income it generates shall also 
be used efficiently so that it can offer qualitative services.” (Congress Text May 2005: 3)
The Vlaams Belang campaigns for a socially-corrected free economy, speaks in 
favour of less government intervention and aspires to an economy with a regulatory 
government instead of an economy controlled by it. In contrast to Keynesianism 
claiming government intervention to stimulate economic consumption, the party 
also focuses on a supply-side economic model that relies on promoting production.
According to Say’s law – ‘every offer creates its own demand’ – consumption follows 
production. The government has to invest and to reward work and investment risks 
instead of punishing them. The central belief of the micro-economic model is that 
unique chances on the market (like low taxes or technological innovations) may lead 
to a faster growth rate of the economy. (Manifesto, 24)
In general, it can be said that the party’s advocacy of a more restricted governing 
body, that focuses on production rather than consumption, is clearly rooted in 
liberal principles. Yet, it differs from the doctrine of laissez-faire, neo-liberalism 
of Thatcher in the UK or Reagan in the USA (Heywood 2003). Indeed, in combi-
nation with its principles in favour of a free market and a restricted government 
body, the party presents some protectionist measures and sees limitations of the 
market principle in some areas.
The nuclear responsibilities of the government, like public services, may not be 
privatized. Cooperation with the private sector may, however, optimize these tasks. 
(Manifesto, 31)
The need for an efficient government is also put forward in the party’s rhetoric on 
globalisation. The rhetoric of delocalisation and globalisation is indeed an argu-
mentative vehicle for presenting the aim of constructing an efficient government. 
Global competitiveness is the key, and in order to be competitive, the state has to 
use the public funds in an efficient way.
Economies in a free market are only serviceable to the common interest when gov-
ernment supports them in an appropriate and efficient way. If not, they will delo-
calise. Hence, it is important that the public resources which are used by the govern-
ment will pay.
The above paragraph includes a clear prediction: if the government won’t 
conduct an efficient policy, they (i.e., the economies) will delocalise. Hence, the 
Vlaams Belang constructs a topos of fear and a warning story: bad things will hap-
pen when the options for an efficient policy are not implemented. In his study of 
policy documents, Fairclough (2003) found similar slippages between description 
and prediction: claims about what is the case alternate with predictions about what 
will happen. The legitimation here applies to policies, to what we must do, and these 
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policies are legimated by the claims about globalisation and delocalisation. It is 
also worth noting that the principal agents in the economies, the entrepreneurs and 
companies, are not mentioned. Only the economies, which are assumed to be free 
market and global, in general are represented. Hence, globalisation is represented as 
a process without social agents – as something which is just happening rather than 
something that companies are doing (see also Fairclough 2000 for New Labour).
The Vlaams Belang’s liberal way of thinking in favour of a more restricted and 
more efficient governing body can also be observed in the party’s demand for more 
business-like ways of making the government work. It is otherwise remarkable how 
the party itself – speaking of a business world unfortunately infested with English terms 
(Focus Text, 18)2 – uses an English term (New Public Managament) in this context.
A modern relationship between the business world and the government is one of 
the most important challenges of this century. The New Public Management pos-
sesses characteristics from business economics. Reflection on how administrations 
can perform ‘government’ differently is a commendable initiative. (Focus Text, 16)
Similarly, traditional parties speak in favour of the introduction of modern man-
agement techniques in public administrations. Part of the Copernicus reform of 
federal public services, for instance, elaborated by former Minister of Civil Service 
Affairs Luc Van den Bossche (SP.A), implied the introduction of principles per-
taining to modern human resources management. The Flemish government’s BBB 
(Dutch abbreviation for Better Government Policy – Beter Bestuurlijk Beleid) 
represented the release of a ‘new’ organisation of government according to mod-
ern organisational principles. At the end of 2005, a Task Force Corporate Governance 
was established and charged with examining principles of ‘Good Governance’ or 
‘Corporate Governance’ – a hot item in the private sector during the past few years –  
could be integrated into the new structure of Flemish public services.
The Vlaams Belang’s negative view of the public sector stands in sharp con-
trast to its positive attitudes towards the entrepreneurial world. This is evident 
from the following rhetorical question:
Is not the realization that a failing economy is probably due in the first place 
to wrongly chosen government meddling, and not to entrepreneurs or employers, 
becoming increasingly widespread? (Draft Manifesto, 6)
Entirely in line with the Vlaams Belang’s populist discourse, companies are also 
attributed the positive characteristic of listening to the population’s wishes, whereas 
the government fails to do so. This evaluative statement can be observed in the 
following paragraph:
These days, citizens stand up for themselves more than they used to, and they wish 
to be known not only in their needs, but also in their preferences. Companies take 
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this into account, the government continues doing this insufficiently. It is still too 
patronizing to the population, but also to the business world. (Draft Manifesto, 15).
The Civil Democracy envisaged by Verhofstadt in its Civil Manifestos (1991 
and 1992), too, specifies that politicians ought to base their decisions on existing 
attitudes among business managers and marketing people, such as sensitivity to 
what consumers want and making themselves known to consumers by means of 
publicity (Blommaert 2001). Politics should therefore take on practical models 
that are successful in management and marketing: a bond with consumers, name 
familiarity, openness … In its May 2005 Congress text, the VLD states that “public 
services should target their clients more and become more efficient” (8).
.  An enterprise-friendly Flanders
The Vlaams Belang’s faith in reduced state control is in keeping with its zeal to 
create an enterprise-friendly climate. According to the party, government inter-
vention obstructs such a climate. To create an enterprise-friendly climate, lower-
ing high fiscal pressure is an important recipe according to the Vlaams Belang. A 
practical example containing a business manager’s point of view is to clarify the 
party’s discourse in favour of lower tax pressure.
If BASF Antwerp were to relocate to Germany, overall wage costs would be a good 
20% or 65 million euros lower on a yearly basis. Dejaegher (BASF Antwerp’s CEO): 
In cooperation with the social partners and the government we urgently need to 
start a search for alternatives to this severe handicap that not only obstructs all 
investments, but also destroys jobs, especially for older workers.” BASF’s CEO em-
phasizes a decrease in fiscal pressure with regard to labour and flexible payment, 
stating, for instance, that the settled tax reduction on shift work bonus schemes will 
barely cause a decrease – from 30% to 29% – in the competitive disadvantage with 
Germany. (Focus Text, 14)
Once again different experts and figures are mentioned as an argumentative strat-
egy and once again reference to people or studies outside the party constitutes a 
powerful technique of proving party statements. Referring to persons in whom 
some kind of institutional authority is nested, has indeed been presented as an 
important strategy of legitimation by scholars on discourse analysis (Fairclough 
2003). Moreover, quoting Flemish entrepreneurs proves the Vlaams Belang uses a 
discourse that is also to be found among entrepreneurs.
At the Bekaert general meeting (11th May 2005), Baron Paul Buysse – a person dif-
ficult to suspect of nationalist or even regionalist sympathies – strongly advocated an 
enterprise-friendly climate. […] ‘To our surprise, we observe that the government 
continues its efforts to discourage, if not chase industrial enterprises, job providers 
par excellence, out of the country.’ (Focus Text, 6)
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According to the Vlaams Belang, high fiscal pressure is also the reason for the lack 
of foreign investment, as is clearly shown in the quote below containing the prob-
lem of stagnation of foreign investment and its causes.
Still, we are not surprised that under current excessive federal fiscal pressure and 
with the jungle of rules and regulations at different government levels, foreign in-
vestment has barely increased in the past few years. (Draft Manifesto, 20)
The reader is invited to share this diagnosis, perhaps inducing her/him to agree 
with the explicit solution contained in the text, particularly the reduction of feder-
al fiscal pressure and of the large amount of rules. With this solution the party re-
turns to its most important economic recipes, i.e., the reduction of fiscal pressure 
and the simplification of administration. These are also the key items of the VLD’s 
economic rhetoric. In its May 2005 Congress text, for example, the party talks of 
“a ponderous Belgian administration” and advocates “simplification in favour of en-
trepreneurs and radical simplification of existing laws and regulations”. Apart from 
that, the party also wishes to reduce general fiscal pressure and wage costs.
Still, even though the Vlaams Belang refers to a lack of foreign investments, 
the party is at the same time alarmed over the ‘internationalisation’ of the Flemish 
economy and speaks in favour of keeping as much strategic sectors as possible in 
Flemish control. The following example is illustrative and is also an example of 
what Fairclough (2003, 167) calls ‘futurology’: injunctions about what must be 
done are legitimized in terms of predictions about the future. In this case, the fu-
turological prediction is that more SME’s will be sold to foreign companies if the 
government does not invest more in research and development.
It is alarming that an ever-increasing number of SMEs is sold to foreign companies. 
The best way to keep our Flemish companies in Flemish hands is via investments in 
research and development. (Manifesto, 39)
This corresponds with Mudde’s (1999) conclusion that for the Flemish extreme right-
wing party, the Flemish entrepreneurs should be protected against foreign investors. 
It is also in line with the party’s ethno-linguistic and Flemish-nationalist rhetoric. The 
party also claims that strategic sectors like gas and electricity should remain as much as 
possible under Flemish control. Yet, the party – in line with its liberal slogans – states 
that this anchoring should be organised by the entrepreneurs themselves.
In order to create an enterprise-friendly Flanders, the Vlaams Belang calls for 
the weakening of unions. It accuses the unions of not managing workers’ interests – 
blaming them, as they blamed the government, for not paying attention to people’s 
wishes and desires. This is phrased as follows in a rhetorical question:
Do not the unions thus become defenders of replacement income rather than 
managers of working people’s interests? (Draft Manifesto, 18)
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In line with this general negative view of the unions, the party is opposed to insti-
tutionalised union structures in SMEs.
Union organisations, for example, continue their attempts to access SMEs employ-
ing less than 50 people. […] In smaller enterprises it ought to be possible in the first 
place for informal consultation formulas to play their part to the fullest. (Focus 
Text, 16)
This follows the discourse used by Unizo, the Flemish association of self-employed 
business owners (Unie van Zelfstandige Ondernemingen). The association reso-
lutely refused to accept the bill submitted to the Chamber of Representatives by 
the Flemish and French-speaking socialists aimed at the compulsory creation of 
a Committee for Prevention and Protection at Work (Comité voor Preventie en 
Bescherming op het Werk) for SMEs employing 20 to 50 people. A similar union 
committee is now compulsory for a minimum of 50 workers. Karel Van Eetvelt, 
Unizo CEO, accordingly stated during an interview with the Flemish newspaper 
De Morgen (28th November, 2005) that a number of the Vlaams Belang’s econom-
ic programme points had been copied from Unizo’s programme. At any rate, this 
proves that the Vlaams Belang wishes to appeal to (small) enterprises. Indeed, the 
party’s Economic Manifesto contains an SME plan presenting 14 measures specifi-
cally targeting such small scale businesses. “This shall give self-employed business 
owners, shop owners, small and medium enterprises every chance to secure future 
prosperity.” (Manifesto, 35). The plan suggests, for example, grouping all SME-related 
powers under one Flemish minister, relieving their administrative burden, and 
introducing fiscal incentives for investments in security. The plan also includes the 
party’s opposition to an institutionalised union structure for SME’s.
This attention to small businesses may also be found in the programmes of 
other extreme right parties like the FPÖ and the SVP (Mudde, 2007). The party’s 
explicit attention to SMEs corresponds to the populist rhetoric it uses to represent 
the voice of the people or the man on the street. In this particular case, the party 
stands up for (small) enterpreneurs. Appealing to the small business owner is in 
keeping with Kitschelt’s (1995) definition of the ‘Winning Formula’ in that suc-
cessful extreme right-wing parties are attempting to charm small business owners 
with neo-liberal policies.
.  Conclusion and discussion
In the literature on the group of extreme right parties, there is an ongoing debate 
about these parties’ views on the economy. While Kitschelt’s (1995) conceptual 
and theoretical model of the extreme right includes neo-liberalism as a feature of 
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the extreme right, others (a.o. Mudde 1999 and forthcoming; Rydgren 2002) have 
argued that these parties are rather nationalist and protectionist when it comes 
to economy. In this article, we have shed new light on this debate by a systematic 
analysis of the discourse that the Vlaams Belang (one of the most successful ex-
treme right parties in Europe) employed during its Economic Congress, organised 
in November 2005. Applying a qualitative discourse analysis, we demonstrate that 
the primary focus of the party lies on the principle of a Flemish economic policy. 
As such, the party continues its discourse of Flemish independence, thereby at-
tacking the Walloon (and particularly socialist) policy makers who are presented 
as the main culprits for the Walloon economic malaise. The texts published on the 
occasion of the Economic Congress also call for less state interference, lower taxes 
and deregulation. Hence, they clearly possess liberal characteristics. Consequent-
ly, the Vlaams Belang’s discourse is in keeping with Kitschelt’s (1995) definition of 
the Winning Formula, though we prefer to speak of a liberal programme instead 
of a neo-liberal one. Neo-liberalism indeed amounts to a form of market funda-
mentalism (Heywood 2003), whereas the Vlaams Belang’s programme includes 
some protectionist measures and state dirigisme. Overall, it seems that with its 
liberal slogans, the party – in accordance with Kitschelt’s (1995) ideas – focuses 
on an appeal to the group of entrepreneurs, whereas the party’s ethnocentric and 
authoritarian ideas aim at the working classes. Interestingly, moreover, these lat-
ter groups are completely overlooked in the economic texts. The organisation 
of an Economic Congress by the Vlaams Belang thus can be interpreted as an 
effort to extend its group of voters with people representing entrepreneurial ini-
tiative: traditional liberal voters. The inclusion of economic issues in the party 
programme is instrumentalised to attack competitors and attract voters (Mudde 
2007). At any rate, the economic issue remains a secondary feature for the party. 
Hence, we cannot agree with the central position the economic discourse occu-
pies in Kitschelt’s (1995) explanation of the success of extreme right-wing parties. 
Congress President Gerolf Annemans phrased this using the following meta-
phor during his speech at the Congress: “The body, the interior and the engine 
of the Flemish-national party remain the same; we are equipping it today with an 
economic GPS system.”
Besides our aim to add a new perspective to the ongoing debate regarding the 
economic viewpoints of successful extreme right parties, the paper also sought to 
bring discourse analysis to the study of extreme right parties. Discourse studies 
have thus far been of secondary interest to extreme right scholars. However, as a 
growing body of scholarship locates the success or failure of extreme right parties 
by the parties themselves or the supply-side of extreme right voting (Norris 2005), 
future research should focus more on the parties’ discourse as an explanatory vari-
able in their success. Since this discourse is employed in a strategic interaction with 
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other parties, studying the discourse in its context through the application of dis-
course analysis has demonstrated to be a useful methodology. Our case study has 
indeed shown how the Vlaams Belang – after having attracted socialist voters in 
the beginning of the nineties – is currently looking for (small) entrepreneurs and 
businessmen. These have traditionally voted for the liberal parties, were under-
represented within the Vlaams Belang’s electorate until the end of the nineties 
(Depickere & Swyngedouw 2002) and currently seem dissatisfied with Verhofstadt’s 
‘leftist’ economic policy. The party therefore occupies the discourse space that has 
been developed by other parties. Bauböck (2002) came to a similar conclusion 
for the FPÖ’s nation-building discourse in which the party benefited from the 
legitimacy its political opponents had provided for its major programmatic planks. 
The Vlaams Belang’s economic rhetoric specifically resembles the language used 
by Verhofstadt in his Civil Manifestos, and revolves around less government, a 
more efficient and market-oriented administration and more Flanders. Just like 
Verhofstadt in the past, from the benches of the opposition the Vlaams Belang can 
develop a radical strategy that does not need to compromise or elaborate on policy 
options that will actually be pursued. The Civil Manifestos’ inheritance as well as 
the ‘move towards the left’, regretted by several liberal representatives and mem-
bers, too, are part of an explanation for the Vlaams Belang’s strategy. The party 
appears to be searching for certain programmatic points with the hope of seduc-
ing (disappointed) supporters of the liberal party. In the beginning of the nineties, 
the party made a similar move towards the socialist voters. On the occasion of the 
Socio-Economic Congress organised by the party on 5th December, 1993, Gerolf 
Annemans stated: “In that matter, we shall deliver a fatal thrust to the socialists. 
After their voters, we shall also take over their themes.” (van den Brink 2005). Future 
research could test the hypothesis that with a strategic choice in their rhetoric, ex-
treme right parties might attract a new type of electorate. Doing so might lead us 
to better understand the mechanism through which radical right parties succeed 
in extending their electorate while not loosing their original electorate. Hence, 
more research is also needed to investigate how extreme right parties, and the 
Vlaams Belang in particular, integrate the different issues they handle in a (coher-
ent) discourse which is attractive for different types of electorate.
Notes
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1. All quotes have been translated into English by the author.
. In its Economic Manifest (74–75) the party elaborates this point of view, pointing out linguistic 
alienation at the top of several companies, and advocates maintaining the so-called September 
Decree from 1973. One of this decree’s stipulations is that for written social relations between em-
ployers and employees the sole use of Dutch is allowed in the Dutch linguistic area.
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